

SECRET

30 November 1982

MEMORANDUM

~~The Intelligence~~ Polish Monitoring Group, under the Chairmanship of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Palmer, ~~has been meeting~~ periodically since mid-October to coordinate a series of activities sponsored or encouraged by the US Government to mark the first anniversary of the declaration of martial law in Poland. The original list may be found at Attachment A. The NSC staff members of the Group have consistently indicated Presidential interest in having these activities take place, but have been consistently guarded about personal Presidential participation.

Prospects for West European cooperation with these activities has been problematical from the beginning. Once Walesa was released in early November and Solidarity's call for strikes and demonstrations fizzled on November 10th, the enthusiasm of some US Government agencies, the AFL-CIO, and the Polish American Congress apparently waned, and even the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference recently held in Washington failed to acknowledge a letter from Under Secretary Damm soliciting its cooperation. ~~As a consequence,~~ few major events are currently contemplated other than some sort of Presidential statement, the President's reception of Solidarity leaders in exile, and his placing the first bouquet for a floral cross somewhere in the vicinity of the White House.

~~What follows is our appreciation of the key trends underway in Poland,~~ plus at Attachment B a copy of our last feature article on Polish events from the National Intelligence Daily.

The Jaruzelski regime seems intent on removing some of the trappings of martial law later this month--possibly as early as the 13th--to create the appearance of movement toward normalization.

- The virtual failure of planned Solidarity demonstrations on 10 November, and the lack of significant public response to the release of Walesa have boosted regime confidence.

State Dept. review completed

-1-
SECRET

SECRET

- New laws have been passed to ensure the post-martial law regime broad powers to maintain control and more legislation may be in the works.
- Martial law may be replaced by a state of emergency that could be phased out over the next several months--with Jaruzelski possibly administering broad powers as newly elected state president.

Some things will change with the formal lifting of martial law.

- Most of the remaining 700 internees will be released and there may be partial amnesty of those convicted of violating martial law restrictions.
- Most military bodies will be dissolved including WRON and the special military operations groups.

Jaruzelski will not totally eliminate the presence of the military in government and the party because it is an organization he trusts and represents his personal power base.

- The nationwide system of defense committees will stay in place to ensure public order.
- Recent statements by Jaruzelski and military authorities indicate key industries will probably remain militarized.

While continuing to give priority to maintaining control, Jaruzelski may attempt to gain some popular support by pushing promised economic and administrative reforms.

- Implementation will remain difficult because of continuing resistance from party hardliners and bureaucrats.

Jaruzelski's work may be made easier by the present cooperative attitude of the Church and underground Solidarity's cancellation of demonstrations set for 13 December.

- Glemp has consistently opposed the use of strikes and demonstrations, favoring instead dialogue and negotiations.
- Glemp recently echoed the government position when he called for an end to the artists' and actors' boycott of Polish television.

SECRET

SECRET

- Church officials have urged moderation on Walesa and some have encouraged him to work with the new unions.
- Moderates appear to have regained control of underground Solidarity and have indicated that they are ready to take orders from Walesa who is now considering his future actions.

SECRET

Attach A

Poland: Commemorating the First Anniversary of Martial Law

K

Despite the delegatization of Solidarity, the union -- and particularly its defiant leader Lech Walesa -- remains an important symbol of resistance to the martial law regime for the vast majority of Poles. We have an opportunity to encourage this spirit of resistance by taking steps which will dramatize our support for the Polish people and their centuries-old drive for freedom and democracy. Two dates are of particular importance; November 10, and December 13. November 10 is the second anniversary of the formal registration of Solidarity as a trade union, and underground Solidarity has called for eight hour strikes throughout the country on that date. While it is impossible to predict what will happen, any actions are likely to be limited to the factories and thus may not be subject to public scrutiny. The international trade union movement, however, is planning to mark the date with statements, speeches, and a one day boycott of Polish ships and planes.

A more propitious date, from our standpoint, is December 13, the first anniversary of martial law. It has a tremendous symbolic importance not only for the one-third of the Polish populace which formerly belonged to Solidarity, but to millions of others, who deeply resent martial law and what it has done to their country.

We are considering a number of actions which would be aimed at keeping the cause of Polish freedom and self-determination alive in the West and showing the Polish people our support during their time of struggle. Our strategy is to build towards December 13 with a number of events beginning on November 9 and with heaviest concentration on December 12 and 13. They include:

PRIMARY ACTION

-- November 9: Make the Polish situation the focal point of the upcoming CSCE meeting in Madrid.

EUR/RPM

-- November 9: Send delegation of Solidarity leaders-in-exile to Madrid.

EUR/EEY

-- November 10: The union activities mentioned above in Europe, the U.S., and Japan.

EUR/P

Original SS Program - a 50 broadcast, radio
-- Late November or Early December: A meeting between the Secretary and well-known Polish emigre *Wielowski, other Solidarity leaders* Jan Nowak to show our commitment to the struggle now going on in that beleaguered country.

EUR/EEY

-- Early December: Encouraging state legislatures to pass resolutions in favor of Solidarity. *emphasize on city council*

H

-- Early December: Attempt to arrange a special benefit showing of the new film on Mahatma Gandhi, which is not only excellently done, but presents clear parallels with the situation in Poland and Solidarity's effort to bring about peaceful change. USIA

-- Early December: Release a new USIA documentary on the Polish struggle, similar to the Oscar winning film done on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. *early in Nov. trip* USIA

-- Early December: Encourage Congress to pass appropriate resolutions. H

-- December 9-10: Gain Allied agreement for a strong hard-hitting statement at the NATO Ministerial. EUR/RPM

Sunday
-- December 12: Call on major churches, and especially the Roman Catholic Church to make the situation in Poland a matter of special concern in sermons and liturgical services. EUR/EEY

-- December 12 or 13: A large-scale pro-Solidarity rally in Chicago in December, possibly attended by the President and Lane Kirkland (the EUR/EEY

President expressed interest in participating in such an event provided scheduling questions can be worked out).

-- December 13: Gain Allied cooperation for statements by heads of government deploring the situation in Poland and calling on the Warsaw government to reverse itself and move toward a policy to reconciliation.

EUR/RPM

-- December 13: Persuade the International Sakarhov Committee to present special concerts throughout Europe and the U.S. in honor of Lech Walesa. *Initiations*

USIA

-- December 13: Gain the President's agreement for a cross of flowers to be placed on the White House lawn as a sign of our solidarity with the Polish people. Encourage Allied heads of government to do likewise.

EUR/EEY

-- December 13: Have a national minute of silence. *noise*

H

-- December 13: Attempt to gain agreement of French, British and others to make major speeches in the UN Security Council. *See also in copy*

IO

Drafted by: EUR/EEY:DRHerspring
10/27/82:1740A

Clearances: EUR/EEY:RWFarrand

Special Analysis

POLAND: Easing Martial Law

An end to martial law in the near future will not erode the regime's control or the military's involvement in political affairs. Premier Jaruzelski--with the support of party moderates--may try to carry out some reforms he has advocated but could continue to be thwarted by the bureaucracy and political hardliners. Solidarity is unlikely to mount any immediate, serious challenge, in part because of internal debates over strategy. The Church will continue to counsel moderation and may become more active in representing the people's interests. [REDACTED]

25X1

Jaruzelski appears intent on removing some of the trappings of martial law before the end of the year to show movement toward normalization. The government's confidence has grown since it faced down underground Solidarity on 10 November, released Lech Walesa, and eased many martial law restrictions. [REDACTED]

25X1

The regime also has taken some steps to ensure its control after martial law is ended. Recent legislation provides many legal means to thwart protests. [REDACTED]

25X1

The new trade union law, for example, severely restricts strikes and protests; other laws on "parasitism," alcohol abuse, and juvenile delinquency allow the government considerable latitude in punishing dissenters. Parliament will meet soon to adopt more special measures. [REDACTED]

25X1

The government apparently has not yet decided on modalities for ending martial law. According to one report, it might move in stages, with final action to come possibly in March. In any event parliament may grant the state presidency "emergency" powers to run the country, with Jaruzelski becoming head of state while remaining party leader. [REDACTED]

25X1

--continued

MORI
DOCUMENT -
RIPPUB

25X1 Such an attitude, however, would run into opposition from party hardliners. They would argue that such a lenient policy risks a revival of Solidarity. Party stalwarts in many factories who were opposed to Solidarity have taken the lead in setting up the new unions, even though Warsaw apparently does not want local party organizations to be so blatant. []

Solidarity's Prospects

Despite the fears of some underground activists, Walesa seems unlikely to strike a deal with the regime. He has been cautious in his public statements but still gives the impression of wanting to push for fulfillment of the "spirit" of the agreements of August 1980 that gave rise to Solidarity. []

25X1

Walesa seems inclined to wait for the lifting of martial law before seriously considering future actions. After the beginning of the year, he is likely to try to reestablish contact with the men who formed the core of Solidarity in order to discuss future strategy. []

25X1

Some will argue that any form of resistance is futile in the near term. Others, probably including Walesa, might argue that the only way to keep pressure on the regime to carry out Solidarity's ideas is to try to subvert the new government-sponsored unions. Walesa would require broad agreement from other activists, however, before he would openly support such a controversial policy. []

25X1

The Church's Role

Senior officials of the Church will urge Walesa to work within the new unions, believing this to be the only way to make them represent the workers' interests. Although the Church reportedly may assume financial responsibility for Walesa and his family, it probably will be cautious in associating itself in any formal way with other former union leaders. []

25X1

The Church also may move to fill some of the void left by Solidarity's dissolution. Archbishop Glemp, for example, plans to have the Church advocate more openly the interests of Polish society and to establish closer ties with the workers. The Church also will push the regime to make good on its promised political and economic reforms but--as in the past--will not be able to force the government to take action. [] -CIA, DIA, NSA-

25X1

25X1 As martial law is lifted, some military bodies will be dissolved, including the Military Council of National Salvation and most military special operational groups. Military courts may no longer have jurisdiction over civilian cases. [redacted]

25X1 Remaining restrictions on public assembly and domestic and foreign communications will be removed or eased. Most of the remaining 1,000 internees will be released, although some intellectuals may face legal charges for previous dissident activity. The estimated 8,000 activists charged or convicted of violating martial law will not be released. [redacted]

For security reasons, the military will remain heavily involved in administering the country. Equally important, Jaruzelski looks to the military to assure his personal power and administrative control. Officers in government and party positions may simply don civilian garb, and many overseeing "militarized" factories probably will remain in place. [redacted]

25X1

25X1 The nationwide hierarchy of defense committees--a mainstay of martial law--is likely to retain its key role in ensuring calm and will continue to rely on the secret police and the uniformed civilian police. The military will remain available on short notice to back up civilian forces. [redacted]

Policy Stalemate

25X1 Jaruzelski also may try to make good on some of the economic and administrative reforms he and party moderates have advocated. He will continue, however, to face strong bureaucratic and political resistance. The political impasse might deepen as the armed forces continue to wield considerable power in the face of the expectations of many party officials that they will play a greater role. [redacted]

25X1 The Premier could gain some credibility by showing he is willing to allow the unions more than a nominal role in representing the workers' interests. He might welcome a call by Walesa to have workers join the unions, because this would give them the appearance of legitimacy. [redacted]

--continued